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NOTES
The Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997: North Carolina
Creates an Additional Incentive to Reclaim Contaminated
Properties
Just south of downtown Charlotte, North Carolina, lies an area
called South End that serves a variety of land uses, including low- to
moderate-income housing, commercial and retail establishments, and
industrial sites.1 Historically, the area has been used for industrial
and commercial purposes, beginning in the late 1800s as one of
Charlotte's earliest industrial locations.2 As the city developed and
expanded, however, owners abandoned many of these industrial and
commercial sites or left them unused.3 Some of these sites contain
soil and groundwater contaminated with hazardous or toxic
materials, creating a situation in which owners or prospective
purchasers are reluctant to redevelop the sites for fear of incurring
environmental cleanup liability and extensive cleanup costs.4 These
sites often remain untouched, contributing to the decay of the area
and creating concern among its residents about the potential harms
of contamination.5 The sites are known as "brownfields.
' 6
The situation is changing, however. Realtors and property
developers have begun to redevelop these abandoned industrial
properties.7 The City of Charlotte, with a pilot grant from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA"), is assisting with the
development of remediation8 and cleanup plans for certain sitesY
1. See Bruce Henderson, Charlotte Seeks $200,000 Grant to Redevelop Industrial
Areas, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Mar. 22, 1996, at C1 (describing the South End area of
Charlotte where abandoned industrial sites are located); Doug Smith, South End Gets
Help with Leftover Hazards, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Nov. 10, 1996, at D1 (same).
2. See U.S. EPA, EPA 500-F-97-008, NATIONAL BROWNFIELDS ASSESSMENT
PILor. CHARLOTrE, NC 1 (1997); Henderson, supra note 1, at Cl.
3. See Henderson, supra note 1, at C1.
4. See Taylor Batten, Polluters, Not Developers, May Pay for Brownfields,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, July 27, 1997, at M22; Henderson, supra note 1, at Cl; Smith,
supra note 1, at D1.
5. See Henderson, supra note 1, at Cl; Smith, supra note 1, at D1.
6. See infra text accompanying note 16 (defining "brownfields").
7. See Henderson, supra note 1, at Cl.
8. "Remediation" generally means action to clean up or control the release of
contaminants from contaminated property to protect public health or the environment.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.31(b)(13) (1997).
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Because of this activity, the area is undergoing an "urban
renaissance," with new commercial and residential activity opening in
historic buildings. 10 The North Carolina General Assembly, in
response to concerns from business and industry organizations and
certain local governments," recently adopted an additional tool for
addressing redevelopment of contaminated sites such as those found
in South End: The Bgownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997.12
This Note examines the recently enacted Brownfields Property
Reuse Act of 1997 (the "Act") and the problems involved in cleaning
up contaminated urban industrial sites that led to the passage of the
Act and other initiatives nationwide." It briefly reviews the history
of the Act, examining in detail its main provisions, and summarizes the
concepts underlying the new law.'4 Finally, the Note comments on the
measures adopted by the North Carolina legislature, particularly as
they compare to measures in other similar state programs and
brownfield-program models, and assesses whether the North Carolina
measures will aid in redeveloping brownfield areas."
Brownfields generally are defined as "[a]bandoned, idled, or
under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental
contamination."'1 6  Estimates of the number of brownfields
9. See U.S. EPA, supra note 2, at 1-2.
10. See Kevin R. Boyer, Regulators Look at Ways to Put Contaminated Property Back
to Work, N.C. ENvTL. L. LETTER, Aug. 1996, available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library,
CURNWS File.
11. Telephone Interview with Rep. Daniel F. McComas, North Carolina House of
Representatives (Sept. 12, 1997) [hereinafter McComas Interview]; Telephone Interview
with Richard Whisnant, General Counsel, North Carolina Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (Sept. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Whisnant Interview]. The name of
the state agency responsible for administering the Brownfields Property Reuse Act, as
used in the legislation, is the Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources
("DEHNR"). See Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997, ch. 357, 1997 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 244. The General Assembly changed the agency's name to the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources during the 1997 legislative session as part of the
state's 1997 Appropriations Act. See The Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 1997, ch. 443, pt. XIA, subpts. 1-2, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis Serv. 323,
465-568. The new name and its acronym ("DENR") are used throughout this Note.
12. Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997, ch. 357,1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 244
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310.30 to .40 (1997)).
13. See infra notes 16-68 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 69-149 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 150-228 and accompanying text.
16. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, Brownfields Glossary
of Terms (last modified Sept. 30, 1997) <http'/lwww.epa.gov/swerosps/
bf/glossary.htm#brow>. Commentators and authors reviewing state cleanup initiatives
tend to group "voluntary cleanup" and "brownfields" programs together in discussing the
features of the state programs. See, e.g., Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfleld
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nationwide vary from 150,000 sites17 to nearly 450,000 sites.18 North
Carolina environmental regulatory agencies have not surveyed the
state to determine the number of potential brownfield sites, 9
although commentators estimate that approximately 1000 sites exist
in the state? ° Although a brownfield may exist in any location, most
appear in older urban areas where industry once flourished but has
declined.' Contamination at brownfields sites may range from low
or moderate to extremely hazardous, but most of these sites do not
involve, or have not been evaluated as having, contamination at
levels that would trigger inclusion on federal or state priority cleanup
listsP2  Even at low contamination levels, however, owners and
potential developers of these sites often are reluctant to remediate
the sites "due to serious concerns involving possible environmental
contamination, including difficult and costly cleanup requirements,
uncertain cleanup standards, liability, and unavailable financing." 3
The absence of redevelopment efforts for brownfields contributes to
a number of problems, including reductions in urban area economic
Redevelopment" A State-Led Reform of Superfund Liability, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Winter 1996, at 27,28 (discussing state "voluntary cleanup" programs used to remediate
"brownfield" sites); cf. M. Ann Bradley & David L. Yaussy, The Voluntary Remediation
and Redevelopment Act-West Virginia Restructures Environmental Liability, 99 W. VA.
L. REV. 455, 458 n.10 (1997) (noting that in West Virginia's voluntary cleanup act, the
term "brownfields" connotes a subset of voluntary remediation sites). This Note does not
differentiate between state programs based on nomenclature, or whether a program was
specifically enacted as a "brownfields" program. It addresses elements found in both
types of programs in relation to the elements of the Act.
17. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED 96-125, SUPERFUND-
BARRIERS TO BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT 4 (1996).
18. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, STATE OF THE STATES ON
BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 2
(1995).
19. Telephone Interview with Grover Nicholson, Head, Federal Remediation
Branch, Superfund Section, Division of Waste Management, North Carolina Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (Sept. 16, 1997) [hereinafter Nicholson
Interview].
20. See Charles Case & Peter Anderson, North Carolina's Efforts to Recycle
Brownfields, 10 N.C. LAW. WKLY. 653, Supp. at 4 (1997).
21. See Bernard A. Weintraub & Sy Gruza, The Redevelopment of Brownsites, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1995, at 57,57.
22. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 4; see also
42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (1994) (requiring the establishment of a hazard ranking system for
inclusion of contaminated sites on the federal National Priority List); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-310.2 (1996) (requiring the establishment of a state Inactive Hazardous Waste
Site Priority List for allocating state resources for remediation of contaminated sites); 40
C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A (1997) (describing the methodology for applying the hazard
ranking system to place sites on the National Priority List).
23. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 5.
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development and employment opportunities;-. reductions in urban
tax bases;z5 possible contamination of drindng water supplies and
neighborhood health problems;26 increased dumping of potential
environmental and public health hazards;2  perpetuation of
"environmental justice" problems involving low-income and minority
neighborhoods; and increases in "urban sprawl" and the use of
24. See id. In a recent article, James T. O'Reilly described the disruptive effects that
the abandonment of urbarr industrial sites has had on urban workers and employment:
The sites and the buildings remain, but the recycling has stopped.
Manufacturing jobs have not stayed in the inner city. The social isolation of city
neighborhoods, cited by critics of environmental racism, deepened as
neighborhood jobs departed. The disconnection of inner-city residents from
these relocated sites was amplified by underfunded urban transportation
systems.... Manufacturing shift workers and those who want overtime incentive
pay find it difficult to use public transportation to get to distant sites at unusual
hours. The price of automobile transportation increased very significantly
during the 1970s and 1980s, outpacing the income growth for the manufacturing
worker.... Therefore inner-city residents are less likely to be able to travel out
to distant job sites via personal automobiles.
James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner-City Jobs: Indiana's
Urban In-Fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 47-48 (1994). On a more encouraging
note, a 1996 study by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality of the effects
of that state's modified brownfields-cleanup law indicated that out of 32 municipalities
surveyed, 19 reported a total of "$200 million in private investment in ... Brownfields
properties ... [and] the creation of 2,070 new jobs" after the law was changed to
encourage brownfields redevelopment. Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution
of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 265,286 (1997).
25. See R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup
Legislation, 2 ENVTL. LAw. 101, 107 (1995). When an industrial site is abandoned by its
owner, the municipality where the brownfield site is located "bear[s] some of the cost of
the contamination because the abandonment reduces the host municipality's tax base and
the jobs that are available in the town, and may result in depressed property values in the
vicinity of the contaminated site." Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownflelds to Save
Greenfields: Shifting the Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated
Land, 27 CONN. L. REV. 789,817 (1995).
26. See Joel B. Eisen, 'Brownfields of Dreams'?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary
Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 895. At some brownfield
sites, as at any site where contaminants are not contained, "[e]xposure to harmful, and
often carcinogenic, substances can occur when children play at an abandoned site, when
runoff or migration spreads the contamination to neighboring properties, or through a
number of other pathways." Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmental Liability and the
Brownflelds Phenomenon: An Analysis of Federal Options for Redevelopment, 10 TUL.
ENVTL. LJ. 63, 68-69 (1996).
27. See Eisen, supra note 26, at 895.
28. See id. The issue of environmental justice generally involves the potential for
"disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects ... on
minority populations and low-income populations," Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg.
7629, 7629 (1994), because of the siting or development near those populations of projects
that may involve environmental and public health risks. For a comprehensive evaluation
of brownfields initiatives and their relation to environmental justice, see NATIONAL
ENVTL JusTIcE ADVISoRY COUNCIL, U.S. EPA, EPA 500-R-96-002, ENVIRONMENTAL
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undeveloped suburban and rural areas for industrial development.29
The factors that limit development of brownfields areas stem
primarily from the application of the provisions of the federal
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"),3 and similar laws enacted at the state
level.31 These laws were established to ensure that responsibility for
JUSTICE, URBAN REVITAIZATION, AND BROWNFIELDS: THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC
SIGNS OF HOPE (1996). See generally William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental
Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1,
18-19 (1997) (describing in general the environmental justice concerns regarding
brownfields); Anne L. Kelly, Reinvention in the Name of Environmental Justice: A View
from State Government, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 769,780 (1995) (describing the arguments on
brownfields redevelopment between brownfields redevelopment advocates and
environmental justice advocates). Commentators are divided over whether brownfields
legislation and brownfields redevelopment improve environmental conditions in low-
income and minority areas, or whether they exacerbate environmental justice problems.
See Eisen, supra note 26, at 1002-03 (commenting that brownfields projects "may
perpetuate environmental inequities by increasing the high degree of risk that affected
communities are already forced to bear"); Leslie Goff-Sanders, Brownfield Legislation: A
Viable Option for the Southeast, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 141, 146 (1996-97)
("So long as state legislatures avoid implementing cleanup standards that are too relaxed
in urban areas, the revitalization of the urban areas should please both environmental
justice advocates and urban redevelopment advocates."); Samara F. Swanston, An
Environmental Justice Perspective on Superfund Reauthorization, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 565, 572 (1994) (arguing that flexible cleanup standards for brownfields will
increase risks to poor and minority communities).
29. See Eisen, supra note 26, at 895-97. The development of these "greenfield" areas
(previously undeveloped suburban and rural areas) rather than reuse of brownfields sites
is economically driven, given that studies have found development of brownfields to be
"as much as four times more expensive than construction in 'greenfields.'" CHARLES
BARTSCH & ELIZABmH COLLATON, BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 3 (1997); see also Abrams, supra note 24, at 277-84
(discussing the economic considerations in developing brownfields or greenfields).
Bartsch and Collaton quote an unidentified Illinois real estate developer as stating simply
that "'[t]he numbers just make sense that way,'" when referring to the development of
greenfields rather than brownfields. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra, at 3 (quoting an
unidentified Illinois real estate developer).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); see also Andrew, supra note
16, at 27 ("[T]here is no doubt that the rubric of 'brownfield redevelopment' is being
utilized in a state-driven agenda to 'reform,' at both the state arid federal levels, the
general liability scheme imposed by CERCLA to address contaminated sites in this
country."). Although CERCLA is commonly known as "Superfund," the Superfund
portion of the law is actually the federal fund used to pay for the cleanup of major
hazardous substance contamination and other activities under CERCLA. See 26
U.S.C.A. § 9507 (West Supp. 1997) (creating the Hazardous Substance Superfund). The
monies for the fund come from taxes imposed on certain petroleum products, see 26
U.S.C.A. § 4611 (West Supp. 1997), and chemicals, see 26 U.S.C. § 4661 (1994).
31. See e.g., 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/22-2 (West 1997) (establishing the state's
Hazardous Waste Fund and the liability of certain parties for hazardous substance
contamination); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, §§ 1-18 (Law Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 1997)
(creating the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act); N.C.
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cleaning up sites contaminated by hazardous materials would fall on
those parties primarily responsible for the contamination. 2  In
attempting to reach the parties responsible (and thus have the polluter
pay for remediation), the laws impose expansive liability for cleanup
costs on a broad range of entities that may have contributed to the
contamination? 3 In the case of CERCLA, and many of the state
"mini-CERCLA" laws, "courts have imposed strict, joint and several
liability on those associated with contaminated property,"' " including
later purchasers of the property or lenders who had no connection with
the original contamination. 5 The result has been that "parties try to
avoid owning contaminated (or seemingly contaminated) property,
which then encourages the development of previously unused and
pristine property..., and discourages the development of abandoned
industrial property. '36
The liability consequences of CERCLA mean that the purchaser
of the property may be liable for all of the EPA's cleanup costs and
may be required to reimburse other liable parties for their cleanup
GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310 to -310.13 (1997) (creating the state Inactive Hazardous Sites
Response Act).
32. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,1112 (D. Minn.
1982) ("Congress intended [through CERCLA] that those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying
the harmful conditions they created."); see also Musicland Group, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp.,
508 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (commenting that the Minnesota
Environmental Response and Liability Act was modeled after CERCLA and was
designed to "impose strict liability on those responsible for harm caused by the release of
hazardous substances").
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) (identifying the persons responsible for cleanup
and remediation under CERCLA); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.7 (1997) (identifying
persons responsible for cleanup under the state's Inactive Hazardous Sites Response
Act); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that
CERCLA imposes strict liability on a current owner of contaminated facility or site
regardless of causation); BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 15-16 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997)
(noting that a diverse number of parties may be subject to liability).
34. Eugene E. Smary & Daniel K. DeWitt, Learning from Our Mistakes: Brownfields
Redevelopment, in 1997 WILEY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATE 267, 270 (Carole Stem
& Christian Volz eds., 1997); see also Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930,
934 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that if liability is proven in an action by the federal
government to recover response costs, "all of the defendants are jointly and severally
liable, unless a particular defendant can establish that his harm is divisible, a very difficult
proposition" (citing Farmland Indus. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335,1340,
1342 n.6 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 267-71
(3d Cir. 1992))).
35. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 910 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that secured creditors may be liable under CERCLA even though they are not
operators at a contaminated site).
36. Smary & DeWitt, supra note 34, at 268.
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costs, unless an investigation of a property shows no contamination or
contamination resulting from third-party action outside the chain of
title.37 The costs for cleanup imposed on owners and purchasers of
contaminated property can be significant. The cleanup standards
under CERCLA38 (and most similar state laws) require the
performance of detailed assessments at each site. 9 Standards may vary
depending upon the site and the type of contamination present, with
remediation usually required to meet "all 'applicable' and 'relevant
and appropriate' federal and state standards."4  Consequently,
cleanups often have been conducted cautiously under stringent
standards to ensure minimum risk exposure to future uses from
contamination.4' Estimates of the costs to conduct cleanups of this
nature "range from tens of thousands of dollars into the millions of
dollars for particularly hazardous sites,"'42 with site assessments alone
reaching levels of $210,00. 3
In response to the liability concerns expressed by purchasers of
contaminated properties and lenders involved in such purchases,
Congress amended CERCLA to reduce the potential for extended
liability, including relief from liability for "innocent landowners" of
contaminated property," and, most recently, protection for lenders
37. See Scott H. Reisch, Reaping "Green" Harvests from "Brownfields": Avoiding
Lender Liability at Contaminated Sites (pt. 1), COLO. LAW., Jan. 1997, at 3, 3 [hereinafter
Reisch, Part 1].
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1994).
39. See Eisen, supra note 26, at 907-08.
40. BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, supra note 33, at 24 (quoting, in part, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(d)(2)(A) (1994)).
41. See id, at 24 & 38 n.137. The authors note that "until recently, [the EPA] tended
to assume in its risk assessment that the groundwater [at a contaminated site] would be
used as a drinking water source." Id. at 38 n.137; see also Smary & DeWitt, supra note 34,
at 285 ("EPA has often assumed that contaminated properties should be cleaned up to
levels suitable for residential living... [, thus making] the cost of remediating many sites
... exorbitant and impractical .... "). State cleanup programs similar to CERCLA often
suffer from similar limitations, thus reducing the likelihood that potential redevelopers of
brownfields properties will do so. One commentator has noted that
many state cleanup standards are based upon the federal model and, as such, are
also overburdensome and unrealistic. Many states require cleanup to
background levels, not taking into account the intended use of the land. This
discourages voluntary site cleanups because the cost of cleaning up a site to
pristine conditions usually exceeds the value of the property.
Mark D. Anderson, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternative, NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 22,23.
42. OFFICE OFTECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 8.
43. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 9.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1994); id. § 9601(35)(A)-(B). The defense of an
"innocent landowner," however, generally is limited to instances in which the landowner
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from liability based on a lender's capacity to influence or its right to
control actions at contaminated sites.4" These reforms may help
reduce the reluctance of prospective purchasers and lenders to
become involved in brownfield redevelopment. 4 6 It is unclear,
however, whether relief from potential liability, particularly for
lenders, will trigger substantial investment in brownfield
redevelopment.47 For example, one commentator has noted that
regardless of these reforms, lenders still may be concerned "about
borrowers' solvency due to CERCLA liabilities or business ventures
of questionable economic viability." 48
In addition to the CERCLA reforms of past years, legislation
was introduced in Congress in 1997 that would establish a number of
federal programs designed to encourage brownfield redevelopment
and, in some instances, limit the liability of prospective purchasers of
obtained the property without knowledge of the contamination and after conducting an
inquiry into potential contamination. See id. § 9601(35)(A)(i), (B).
45. See Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. A, Title II, Subtitle E, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-462 to -467
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(n) (West Supp. 1997)) (creating a "safe harbor" to limit
lender liability under CERCLA). Congress's action was prompted in part by the
decisions in two federal cases addressing the "secured creditor" exemption provision of
CERCLA, which provides that secured creditors that do not participate in managing a
contaminated site are exempt from CERCLA liability. The first case, United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), held that "a secured creditor may
incur [CERCLA] liability, without being an operator, by participating in the financial
management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes." Id. at 1557 (footnote omitted). The second case, Kelly v.
United States EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), vacated the EPA's attempt to interpret
the secured creditor exemption to provide protection for certain lenders from CERCLA
liability. See id. at 1109. The results of these cases sent a chill through the lending
community and created uncertainty regarding participation in the remediation of
contaminated sites. See Reisch, Part 1, supra note 37, at 4. For further discussion of the
history leading up to the 1996 amendments that provided lender relief and a description
of the amendments, see generally William W. Buzbee, CERCLA's New Safe Harbors for
Banks, Lenders, and Fiduciaries, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,656 (Dec. 1996),
Joseph M. Macchione, Lender Liability Under CERCLA in Light of the Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996: Does the
Act Spell Lender Relief or Continued Heartburn?, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 81,
101-05, 112 (1997), and Scott H. Reisch, Reaping "Green" Harvests from "Brownflelds":
Avoiding Lender Liability at Contaminated Sites (pt. 2), COLO. LAW., Feb. 1997, at 9, 9-10
[hereinafter Reisch, Part 2].
46. See Reisch, Part 2, supra note 45, at 10.
47. See Buzbee, supra note 45, at 10,662.
48. Id. at 10,663. Professor Buzbee notes that "[m]any disincentives to brownfield
investment remain that are unrelated to environmental liability concerns. Although
brownfields concerns played a role in allowing lenders to obtain CERCLA relief, it
remains an open question whether banks will now seek out opportunities to finance
brownfield-rehabilitation efforts." Id.
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brownfield properties.4 9 Although none of the bills has been enacted
at this time, Congress has adopted legislation that allows a taxpayer
to treat certain remediation expenditures related to particular
brownfield sites as an expense not chargeable to capital accounts that
may be deducted in the tax year of the expenditure.13
The EPA also has taken a number of steps to enhance the
likelihood of brownfields redevelopment. The most notable is the
agency's Brownfield Economic Redevelopment Initiative (the
49. See eg., H.R. 1392,105th Cong. (1997) (creating the Browffields Reuse and Real
Estate Development Act); H.R. 1120, 105th Cong. (1997) (creating the Community
Revitalization and Brownfield Cleanup Act of 1997); S. 18, 105th Cong. (1997) (creating
the Brownfields and Environmental Cleanup Act of 1997). Several of the brownfields
bills were introduced as a result of congressional frustration with the lack of progress in
CERCLA reform efforts. See Superfund Majority Leader Backs Commerce GOP in
Merge of Brownfields with Broad Bill, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA), at D-2 (Sept. 3, 1997),
available in WESTLAW, BNA-NED database. Because of partisan differences on the
need for stand-alone brownfields bills, however, it is unlikely that any of the individual
bills will pass, although some of their provisions or other brownfield measures may be
enacted as part of a CERCLA reform bill. See id; see also Superfund: Boehlert Schedules
Markup Date for Bill Despite Differences with Democrats, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA), at D-
6 (Nov. 7, 1997), available in WESTLAW, BNA-NED database (indicating that House
Superfund reform bill would establish a grant program for brownfield cleanup);
Superfund: Negotiations Lag in Senate Committee; Industry Gives Mixed Reports on
Progress, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA), at D-4 (Oct. 17, 1997), available in WESTLAW,
BNA-NED database (noting that brownfields provisions may be included in Senate
Superfund reform legislation).
50. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 941, 111 Stat. 788, 882-84
(codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 198(a)-(h) (West 1997)). The change provided in the bill
allows current-year deductions of certain brownfields expenditures rather than requiring
capitalization and recovery of the expenditures by a taxpayer over the life of the project.
A previous Internal Revenue Service ruling allowed certain costs of cleanup of
contaminated properties to be deducted in the same year that they were incurred. See
Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. The ruling, however, applied to only owners of
contaminated property, not prospective purchasers, and was unclear whether the current
year deduction applied to only the type of cleanup costs discussed in the ruling. See U.S.
EPA, EPA 500-F-197-155, BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVE 1 (1997). According to the
EPA, the ruling
created potential financial obstacles in the contaminated properties market.
Specifically, owners of contaminated property could remediate their property
and sell the clean property at its full market value, enabling them to fully
recover the cost of remediation. However, prospective purchasers of
contaminated property had to purchase the property at its impaired value,
attributable to the contamination, and capitalize the remediation costs. This
arguably left prospective purchasers at a disadvantage in terms of environmental
remediation expenditures. Additionally, property owners who wanted to
remediate their property and put it to a different use were at a disadvantage
because they were not able to fully deduct their remediation costs in the year
incurred.
Id. The brownfield tax incentive was designed to overcome these confusing problems.
See id.
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"Initiative").51 According to the EPA, the Initiative is "designed to
empower States, cities, Tribes, communities, and other stakeholders
in economic redevelopment to work together in a timely manner to
prevent, assess, safely clean up, and sustainably reuse brownfields."52
The Initiative consists of four general categories of actions: (1)
brownfields demonstration pilot programs, through which the EPA
selects certain communities to participate in agreements that provide
up to $200,000 in funding for pilot programs addressing brownfields
redevelopment; 3 (2) establishment of a federal interagency working
group to develop a national strategy for brownfields redevelopment;
(3) development of job-training programs relating to brownfields
redevelopment;5 and (4) clarification of liability issues relating to
brownfields.5 5 This fourth category includes action by the EPA to
remove or "archive" about 30,000 contaminated sites nationwide that
were listed on the agency's Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Information System
("CERCLIS") as potential Superfund sites. 6 The goal of the archival
51. See U.S. EPA, EPA 500-F-97-092, BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVE 1 (1997) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVE]; see also U.S. EPA, The Brownfields Action Agenda (last updated Sept. 30,
1997) <http'//www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/ascii/action.txt> (explaining the brownfields
initiative and listing EPA accomplishments).
52. BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, supra note 51, at 1.
53. In addition to the Charlotte pilot program mentioned above, see supra note 2, the
EPA has selected the North Carolina cities of Fayetteville and High Point to participate
in the brownfields pilot programs. See U.S. EPA, EPA 500-F-97-128, NATIONAL
BROWNFIELDS ASSESSMENT PILOT: FAYE"TEVILLE, NC 1-2 (1997); U.S. EPA, EPA
500-F-97-131, NATIONAL BROWNFIELDS ASSESSMENT PILOT. HIGH POINT, NC 1-2
(1997). The EPA selects pilot programs following submission of proposals from
communities seeking funding assistance for brownfields redevelopment. The programs
are chosen based on whether a proposal meets certain EPA-designated criteria, including
the effect of brownfields on the community, levels of existing community commitment to
brownfields redevelopment, the development of an environmental justice plan for the
proposal, and national replicability of the proposal's efforts. See U.S. EPA, EPA 500-F-
97-156, THE BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE: PROPOSAL
GUIDELINES FOR BROWNFIELDS ASSESSMENT DEMONSTRATION PILOTs 6,10-14 (1997).
54. The EPA reportedly has initiated these efforts to "foster workforce development
in brownfields communities through environmental education, recruitment of students
from disadvantaged communities, and quality worker training." BROWNFIELDS
ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, supra note 51, at 2; see also U.S. EPA, EPA
500-F-97-158, BROWNFIELDS-WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT 1 (1997) (describing the
agency's job-training efforts relating to brownfields).
55. See BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, supra note 51, at
1.
56. See U.S. EPA, EPA 500-F-97-089, ARCHIVAL OF CERCLIS SITES 1 (1997). The
EPA has recognized the potential problem of CERCLA listing for brownfields sites,
noting that
[a]ll sites reported to EPA as potential Superfund candidates are entered into
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process is to remove sites from CERCLIS that are not actually
contaminated or have minimal levels of contamination so that
developers and lenders are more willing to deal with the sites without
the stigma of a CERCLIS hazardous site label.Y Liability
clarification also includes the issuance of several directives and
guidance by the EPA that limit the liability of property owners for
groundwater contamination caused by a neighboring property,5 8
increase the consideration of future land uses in deciding which
remedies to apply to National Priority List site cleanup,5 9 and state
the conditions under which the EPA will not sue prospective
purchasers of already-contaminated property.60
Finally, the EPA has entered into memoranda of agreement with
eleven states to clarify their respective roles at sites being addressed
under state voluntary cleanup programs and to provide for "division
of labor" at contaminated sites between the EPA and the states.6'
The EPA also has developed a guidance document intended to
address possible developer uncertainty arising from the overlap of
federal and state cleanup authorities.6 The guidance document
CERCLIS. Historically, EPA maintained information about these sites in the
CERCLIS inventory regardless of their status, including sites where it was
determined that no further Federal Superfund interest was warranted. This
practice led to unintended barriers to the redevelopment of these properties
specifically because sites listed in CERCLIS are often automatically considered
risky by the lending industry, making it difficult for potential purchasers to
secure loans to develop these properties. As a result, potential developers may
shy away from these properties simply because they are in [sic] listed in
CERCLIS.
Id.
57. See U
58. See Announcement and Publication of Final Policy Toward Owners of Property
Containing Contaminated Aquifers, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,790, at 34,790-92 (1995).
59. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIRECTIVE No. 9355.7-04, LAND USE IN THE
CERCLA REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS 4 (1995).
60. See Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective
Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60
Fed. Reg. 34,792, at 34,792-95 (1995).
61. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA,
MEMORANDUM: INTERIM APPROACHES FOR REGIONAL RELATIONS WITH STATE
VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAMS 1 (1996); see also Notice of Availability of Final
Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) Language
Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,495, 47,496 (1997)
[hereinafter MOA Guidance] (noting that 11 memoranda of agreement had been signed
by states and EPA regions); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-66,
SUPERFUND: STATE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE
CLEANUPS 48-49 (1997) (listing 10 states that, as of 1995, had entered into memoranda of
agreement).
62. See MOA Guidance, supra note 61, at 47,496-506.
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suggests the use of site designation or screening processes to identify
low-risk sites that can be included in memoranda of agreement
between the EPA and the states regarding state voluntary cleanup
programs, or to identify high-risk sites that cannot be included in
such memoranda of agreement.6
Federal efforts, particularly the lender liability protections
enacted in 1996, may encourage the redevelopment of brownfields.
However, state governments, faced with pressure from public and
private interests to find ways to redevelop or reuse abandoned
industrial sites, have initiated a number of reforms to their laws
governing the cleanup of contaminated sites that may have a greater
initial effect than federal actions.6 At least thirty states have
established some version of voluntary cleanup or brownfield
redevelopment programs to encourage reuse of certain contaminated
sites.6 State voluntary cleanup or brownfields programs vary widely
63. See id The guidance document will be used by the EPA to evaluate state
voluntary cleanup programs before entering MOA. See id at 47,497. The guidance
document has upset state environmental regulatory agencies, which have requested that
the EPA rescind it because of concerns about the possible intrusion into state voluntary
program activities. See States: Withdraw Intrusive Brownfields Guidance State Officials
Tell EPA, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at A6 (Sept. 25, 1997), available In
WESTLAW, BNA-ENV database.
64. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 26 (noting that states "generally have a better
understanding of contaminated sites and communities affected by them" than the federal
government does); Goff-Sanders, supra note 28, at 150 (commenting that despite a
federal willingness to address brownfields, states tend to be the forerunners in this area).
65. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16-301 to -311 (1997) (creating the state's
Voluntary Clean-up and Redevelopment Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m
(West 1995) (creating the state's Urban Sites Remedial Action Program); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 376.77 to .83 (West Supp. 1998) (creating the state's Brownfields Redevelopment
Act); MD. CODE ANN., ENvIR. §§ 7-501 to -516 (Supp. 1997) (creating the state's
voluntary cleanup program); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 260.565-.575 (West Supp. 1998)
(creating voluntary remediation program); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.10 (1996)
(creating a voluntary remediation program); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.01-.99
(Anderson 1997) (creating the state's Voluntary Action Program); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 6026.101-.908 (West Supp. 1997) (creating the state's Land Recycling and
Environmental Remediation Standards Act); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.14-1 to -19 (1996)
(creating the state's Industrial Property Remediation and Reuse Act); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-212-224 (1996) (creating voluntary cleanup oversight and assistance program); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.601-.613 (West Supp. 1997) (creating a voluntary
cleanup program); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a (1997) (creating program for
redevelopment of contaminated properties); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.1 to .4 (Michie
Supp. 1997) (creating state voluntary remediation program and Remediated Properties
Fresh Start Program); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-22-1 to -21 (Supp. 1997) (creating the
Voluntary Remediation and Redevelopment Act).
As indicated previously, commentators tend to use the terms "brownfields" and
"voluntary cleanup" interchangeably in describing state programs. See supra note 16.
Similarly, the number of state brownfield and voluntary cleanup programs identified by
commentators varies. For example, the Environmental Law Institute noted in 1995 that
BROWNFIELDS PROPERTY REUSE ACT
in terms of the specific elements of the programs, the level of state
involvement in the actual cleanup of sites, the required standards for
cleanup of contaminated sites, the liability protection provided and to
whom that protection applies, and state funding assistance for
remediation.6 In general, however, the goals of the programs are to
persuade current owners or prospective purchasers of property to
remediate contamination and to persuade lenders to provide money
to allow these parties to buy or redevelop the property.67 The
programs use a variety of incentives to accomplish these goals, but
most generally offer the use of voluntary remediation agreements with
the state, site-specific remediation standards tied to the intended use of
the property, and project-completion documentation providing future
liability protection.0
Regardless of their differences, state voluntary cleanup or
brownfields initiatives primarily resulted from a combination of
pressures to develop measures to reduce the problems caused by
abandoned industrial sites69 and a concurrent recognition that these
sites often have attributes that, without the uncertainty caused by
31 states had established voluntary cleanup programs. See ENVIRONMENTAL L. INST.,
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1995 UPDATE 51
(1995). The same study commented that "15 [s]tates had established formal brownfields
programs and eight others were in the process of developing some sort of program" by
the end of 1995. Id. at 54. Another commentator identified 22 state voluntary cleanup
programs in early 1996. See Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Recycling Land. Encouraging the
Redevelopment of Contaminated Property, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1996, at 3,
8 [hereinafter Geltman, Recycling Land].
For detailed discussions of the various elements of the state programs enacted to
encourage voluntary cleanup of contaminated sites or brownfields, see the following:
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 61, at 18-45 (summarizing the provisions of
17 state voluntary cleanup programs); BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 29, at 76-90
(discussing state and local tools to promote brownfield project finance); BROVNFIELDS:
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, supra note
33, at 287-681 (reviewing programs of 30 different states); ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN,
A COMPLETE GUIDE TO ENviRONMENTAL AuDrrs 437-95 (1997) (discussing voluntary
cleanup programs); ENVIRONMENTAL L. INST., supra, at 51-55, 123-42 (same); Anderson,
supra note 41, at 23-26 (discussing voluntary cleanup programs adopted by several states);
Andrew, supra note 16, at 28-30 (focusing on midwestern state programs); Eisen, supra
note 26, at 914-79, 1033-39 (discussing voluntary cleanup programs adopted by several
states); Geltman, Recycling Land, supra, at 8-10 (identifying various state brownfield and
voluntary clean-up programs); Goff-Sanders, supra note 28, at 153-64 (focusing on
programs in Florida, Georgia, and Kentucky).
66. See e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL L. INST., supra note 65, at 51-55 (noting the varying
requirements of individual state brownfield and voluntary cleanup programs).
67. See Weintraub & Gruza, supra note 21, at 58.
68. See id.
69. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing the problems created by
brownfields).
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contamination, would make them attractive to development and
business interests.70 Brownfields often occur in areas that satisfy a
number of criteria businesses use in choosing a location, including
"ready access to markets for labor and materials, access to domestic
and international transportation facilities, reduced site preparation
costs, and favorable land value tax treatment. ' 71 These features make
brownfields potentially attractive to business and industry if problems
relating to the contamination of the sites can be overcome.
In 1996, business and industry organizations in North Carolina,
having identified a growing concern in the state regarding the
problems of transferring, financing, or redeveloping brownfields
sites,72 began discussing proposals to create a specific brownfields
redevelopment act. The state already had developed a voluntary
cleanup program as the result of legislation enacted in 1987 that
limits the costs of implementing remediation to a maximum of $3
million for responsible parties agreeing to clean up a site voluntarily
and that allows the voluntary remediation of a site to be
implemented and overseen by private, certified environmental
professionals." Although this program is voluntary and does provide
a means for responsible parties to limit their costs of cleanup, the
70. See Sweeney, supra note 25, at 109.
71. Id. Michael Sweeney identifies in detail how these considerations may come into
play if a company is presented with the option of locating at a brownfields site:
Many Brownfields have immediate access to markets for labor and materials, as
well as access to transportation facilities .... Although suburban locations may
have better access to freeways that serve the domestic marketplace, central-city
locations have immediate access to ... transportation [systems] that permit
industrial facilities to serve both domestic and international marketplaces at
once.
In addition, site preparation costs of a Brownfields redevelopment project
are significantly lower than costs associated with developing virgin land and
resources. Specifically, the cost of installing roadways, water lines, sewers, and
electricity is de minimus [sic] when compared to the costs of constructing the
same infrastructure at an undeveloped "Greenfields" site.
... Locating an industrial or manufacturing site near existing operations
also provides ready access to trained workers. In addition, zoning and land-use
restrictions pertinent to Brownfields normally reflect the facility's former use.
In most instances, Brownfields are zoned for industrial or commercial uses.
Id. at 108-09.
72. See Case & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2; see also Wade Rawlins, 'Recycling' of
Sites Gets House OK, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 18, 1997, at A3
(providing business community rationale for development of the bill and comments by
industry officials); Steve Tuttle, General Assembly to Debate Brownfield Legislation,
NORTH CAROLINA, Feb. 1997, at 22, 22-23 (describing problems encountered by
businesses that prompted legislation in the state).
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.9 (1997) (establishing provisions for voluntary
remediation program).
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program does not allow for variation from statewide cleanup
standards.74 Such variation would allow remediation to levels that
may be more appropriate for specific proposed brownfields uses.75
These shortcomings have been identified as limiting the usefulness of
the voluntary cleanup program for brownfields sites.76  One
participant in the development of the Act noted that brownfields
legislation would help ensure that the state "remain[ed] in step" with
emerging federal brownfields initiatives and that redevelopment
programs similar to the Charlotte brownfields development program
would be encouraged.?
North Carolina Citizens for Business and Industry ("NCCBI")
spearheaded the early industry discussions regarding the legislation.8
As the discussions progressed, however, other stakeholders in this
type of legislation, including environmental organizations and the
state Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR"),79 became involved in negotiations on the proposal.80
Although these entities "share[d] an interest in getting ... industrial
sites cleaned up and put back into productive use,"' they were
concerned with several provisions of the initial proposal. For
example, they questioned whether the definition of "brownfields" in
the proposed legislation should be limited to ensure that the "relaxed
provisions" of the legislation could not be claimed "by the owner of
... any contaminated property looking to avoid responsibility." 2
Environmental groups and DENR were troubled by the fact that
extensive limits on liability for remediation costs might allow parties
responsible for actual contamination of sites to attempt to take
74. See Case & Anderson, supra note 20, at 4.
75. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (describing the use of site-specific
standards for brownfields).
76. See Case & Anderson, supra note 20, at 4.
77. See Tuttle, supra note 72, at 23.
78. See id. at 22; Telephone Interview with William Holman, North Carolina Chapter,
The Nature Conservancy (Sept. 19, 1997) [hereinafter Holman Interview]; Whisnant
Interview, supra note 11.
79. See supra note 11 (discussing the name change of this department).
80. See Case & Anderson, supra note 20, at 3; Whisnant Interview, supra note 11.
81. Tuttle, supra note 72, at 23; see also Batten, supra note 4, at M22 (noting
environmentalist approval of legislation for reusing abandoned inner-city sites to preserve
undeveloped land). Environmental group representatives involved in development of the
legislation, although concerned whether residents near brownfields would be fully
apprised of a redevelopment initiative, reportedly felt that the bill was an acceptable
trade-off because it provided a means of increasing the cleanup of contaminated
properties. See Bruce Henderson, Cleanup Limit Asked for Industrial Sites, CHARLOT7E
OBSERVER, May 27,1997, at C1.
82. Tuttle, supra note 72, at 23-24.
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advantage of the brownfields legislation's protections." The
discussions held among these various interests resulted in a
compromise providing limited liability from state action for
remediation to "prospective developers" of sites.'4  This term
includes persons who want to buy or sell brownfields properties for
redevelopment, but does not include persons responsible for
contaminating the site. 5
In April 1997, after months of negotiations and discussions,
Representative Daniel McComas of Wilmington filed House Bill
1121, which created the Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997.
The bill was introduced in the House on April 21, 1 99 7 ,8 and had its
first hearing in the House Committee on Environment on May 14,
1997.88 At that meeting, Representative McComas stated the basic
rationale behind the Act, commenting that "these sites typically
provide no positives for the areas in which they are located, and that
by recycling them you bring them into productive use."8 9 The bill was
reported from the Committee as a committee substitute 0 The bill
was passed by both the House and the Senate and enacted on August
1, 1997.91
As enacted, the Act establishes the findings of the North
83. See id. at 24; Holman Interview, supra note 78; Whisnant Interview, supra note
11.
84. See Case & Anderson, supra note 20, at 4; Whisnant Interview, supra note 11.
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.31(b)(10) (1997).
86. Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997, ch. 357, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 244
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310.30 to .40 (1997)).
87. See 47 Daily Bull.: Actions by the N.C. Gen. Assembly (Legis. Reporting Serv.,
N.C. Inst. Gov't) at 4,48-49 (Apr. 21,1997).
88. See NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE COMM. ON ENV'T, MINUTES: MAY 14,1997, at 1-
2.
89. 1& at 1.
90. See id. at 2. The committee substitute made a number of clarifying and technical
changes to the original bill. See Committee Substitute for House Bill 1121, May 14, 1997.
The substitute also deleted provisions that imposed felony penalties for certain violations
of the Act, deleted appropriations to DENR for implementation of the Act, and created a
revolving trust fund for deposit of monies for implementing the Act. See NORTH
CAROLINA GEN. ASSEMBLY, FISCAL RESEARCH Div., LEGISLATIVE FISCAL NOTE, June
2,1997, at 2.
91. The bill was reported favorably from the House Committee on Finance on June
11, 1997, see NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE COMM. ON FIN., MINUTES: JUNE 10, 1997, at 4,
and was passed by the House on June 18, 1997, see 81 Daily Bull.: Actions by the N.C.
Gen. Assembly (Legis. Reporting Serv., N.C. Inst. Gov't) at 2 (June 18, 1997). After
receiving consideration by two Senate committees, the bill passed the Senate on July 23,
1997. See 101 Daily Bull.: Actions by the N.C. Gen. Assembly (Legis. Reporting Serv.,
N.C. Inst. Gov't) at 2 (July 23,1997). The House ratified the bill on July 24, 1997, and the
bill was enacted into law on August 1, 1997. See 107 Daily Bull.: Actions by the N.C.
Gen. Assembly (Legis. Reporting Serv., N.C. Inst. Gov't) at 2 (Aug. 4,1997).
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Carolina General Assembly that brownfields are attractive for
redevelopment,' the use of brownfields is restricted by the threat of
liability for contamination, 93 redeveloping brownfields will benefit
the state through improved local tax bases and new employment,94
and the public should be involved in brownfield redevelopment
projects.95 The Act defines "brownfields property" or "brownfields
site" as "abandoned, idled, or underused property at which expansion
or redevelopment is hindered by actual environmental contamination
or the possibility of contamination and that is subject to remediation
under [state or federal cleanup laws]. ' 96  One of the important
findings of the General Assembly was that "[p]otential purchasers
and developers of brownfields ... , including redevelopment lenders,
should be encouraged to provide capital and labor to improve
brownfields without undue risk of liability for problems they did not
create, so long as the property can be ... made safe for appropriate
future use."97
The heart of the Act is the agreement developed by a
prospective developer 98 and DENR to conduct remediation of the
brownfields property to the levels established in the agreement.99
The Act establishes a procedure whereby DENR may enter into a
"brownfields agreement" with a prospective developer that includes
information from the prospective developer, or the parent,
subsidiary, or affiliate of the prospective developer, provided that:
(1) the prospective developer has complied with other brownfields
agreements into which it has entered; (2) the property will be
remediated to standards suitable for the uses prescribed in the
agreement rather than current cleanup standards;1' ° (3) there is a
92. See Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997, ch. 357, § 1(1), 1997 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 244,244.
93. See Id. § 1(2), 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 244.
94. See Id. § 1(3), 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 244.
95. See id. § 1(5), 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 244.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.31(b)(3) (1997).
97. Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997, ch. 357, § 1(4), 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 244,244.
9& See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.31(b)(10) (1997). As mentioned above, the.
definition of "prospective developer" is restricted to a purchaser or a later-acquiring
party and does not allow the party responsible for the contamination to take advantage of
the provisions of the Act. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. The responsible
party would still have to complete remediation of the site pursuant to other state or
federal hazardous site cleanup requirements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.31(b)(10)(1997).
99. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.32 (1997).
100. The phrase "current standards," as used in the Act, "means generally applicable
standards, guidance, or established methods" for contaminants established by statute or
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public benefit commensurate with any liability protection provided to
the prospective developer under the Act; and (4) the prospective
developer will have the financial, managerial, and technical resources
to complete the requirements of the agreement.1 ' The Act also
allows the incorporation of land-use restrictions in the agreement so
that remediation activities will take into account the restrictions.'12
Finally, in addition to a description of the site, applicable remediation
standards, and the methods for remediation, the Act provides that
the agreement may contain a statement of the desired results of the
project, the guidelines for accomplishing these results, and the
potential consequences for failure to achieve the desired results.103 A
decision by DENR not to enter into a brownfields agreement,
including any terms of the agreement, is subject to review under the
contested case provisions of the North Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act. °4
The Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997 provides that a
prospective developer who enters into a brownfields agreement with
DENR and who complies with the terms of the agreement will not be
held liable for remediation of contaminants identified in the
agreement.10 5  This liability protection applies as long as the
brownfield redevelopment activities under the control or direction of
regulation, instead of certain risk-based standards established by the state Environmental
Management Commission. See id § 130A-310.31(b)(5). Although the definition states
that the term "current standards" does not include risk-based standards established
"pursuant to this Part," see id., the part of the statutes created by the Act does not
mention risk-based standards, see id. §§ 130A-310.30 to .40. The definition of "current
standards" was included in amendments to the Dry-Cleaning Solvent Cleanup Act of
1997, ch. 392, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 6, which does authorize DENR to adopt a risk-
based approach for remediation under that Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
215.104D(b)(3) (Supp. 1997) (authorizing DENR to adopt risk-based approaches under
the Dry-Cleaning Solvent Cleanup Act). It is possible that the drafters of the brownfields
statute intended the exclusion of risk-based standards to apply to any risk-based
standards developed by DENR or the Environmental Management Commission, which
would limit the use of such standards under the Act where the term "current standards" is
used. For example, the Act requires a brownfields agreement to show that remediation
will be suitable for proposed land uses rather than being "remediated to current
standards." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.32(a)(3) (1997). This implies that the
remediation would not include risk-based standards, or at least those risk-based standards
developed pursuant to the Dry-Cleaning Solvent Cleanup Act. See iU. § 130A-
310.31(b)(5).
101. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.32(a)(1)-(5) (1997).
102. See Id. § 130A-310.32(b).
103. See id. § 130A-310.32(c)(1)-(5).
104. See id. § 130A-310.36; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-22 to -37 (1995)
(establishing procedures and requirements for administrative hearings).
105. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.33(a) (1997).
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the developer do not increase environmental or public health risks,
and as long as no additional remediation is required of the
developer.106 The Act is not intended to relieve any person receiving
liability protection under the Act from liability for later
contamination the person may cause on the brownfields property.1°7
Liability protection is provided not only to the prospective
developer, but also to agents of the prospective developer involved in
cleanup of the site, future owners of the site, persons who develop or
occupy the site, successors and assigns of persons subject to the
liability protection, and lenders or fiduciaries providing financing for
remediation or redevelopment." 8 The Act also provides that a
person conducting environmental assessments or transaction
screenings on brownfields properties is not considered to be a
potentially responsible party liable for cleanup unless the person
increases the risk to public health or the environment as a result of
the assessment or screening.'(9 The Act is not intended to affect the
right of any person to seek relief or contribution from any party to a
brownfields agreement who may be liable for the brownfields
property."1 It also is not intended to affect the right of any person
liable for brownfields property to seek contribution from any person
who also may be liable for acts relating to the property and who has
not received liability protection under the Act."'
DENR may require additional remediation of a site beyond
what is contained in a brownfields agreement if. (1) the prospective
developer knowingly or recklessly provides false information in
forming the brownfields agreement or in demonstrating compliance
with the agreement;"2 (2) new information is discovered showing
previously unreported contaminants on a site or unreported
contamination of an area of a site that has not been cleaned up to
current standards;" (3) exposure conditions at the site change such
106. See id.
107. See id. § 130A-310.37(a)(4).
108. See UL § 130A-310.33(a)(1)-(5).
109. See iUL § 130A-310.33(b). Environmental site assessments and "transaction
screens" are part of the due diligence investigations conducted by property owners and
lenders to determine whether environmental risks and potential CERCLA liability may
exist. See ENVIRONMENTAL AsPECrs OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACrIONS 180-86 (James
B. Witkin ed., 1995). The "transaction screen" process generally includes "a questionaire
to be completed by the owner of the site or its operator ... ; a site visit; and a records
review." hi at 183.
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.37(5) (1997).
111. See idU § 130A-310.37(6).
112. See id. § 130A-310.33(c)(1).
113. See id. §130A-310.33(c)(2). This situation requires further remediation only if
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that they may lead to unacceptable levels of risk at or in the vicinity
of the site;" 4  (4) DENR discovers new information about
contaminants that increase environmental or public health risks
beyond an acceptable range and that are different than what is
anticipated in the brownfields agreement;"5 or (5) the prospective
developer fails to file a Notice of Brownfields Development as
required by the Act."
6
Generally, a prospective developer wanting to enter a
brownfields agreement with the state must inform the public of the
brownfields remediation and redevelopment plans."7 The first step
in this process is for the prospective developer to submit a Notice of
Intent to Redevelop a Brownfields Property to DENR."8 This notice
must contain the following: (1) a legal description of the location of
the property; (2) a map of its location; (3) a description of the
contaminants involved and their concentrations; (4) a description of
the proposed use of the property; (5) proposed remediation and
investigation efforts; (6) a proposed Notice of Brownfields Property
which will be recorded eventually as part of the deed for the
brownfields property; and (7) the time period for submitting
comments or requesting a public hearing on the brownfields
agreement." 9 Following approval of the Notice of Intent by DENR,
the prospective developer must: (1) provide copies of the notice to
the brownfields agreement sets maximum concentration levels for contaminants and the
newly discovered contaminants raise the levels of public health or environmental risk to
levels greater than what is allowed under the brownfields agreement. See ad
114. See id. § 130A-310.33(c)(3). Changes in exposure conditions at a site include
changes in land use that increase the probability of exposure to contaminants, or the
failure of the remediation efforts to meet the levels of risk embodied in the brownfields
agreement. See idU
115. See id § 130A-310.33(c)(4). If a person uses or changes the use of the
brownfields property such that environmental or public health risks are increased, DENR
may require that person to perform additional remediation. See id
116. See i. § 130A-310.33(5); see also infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text
(describing the Notice of Brownfields Property requirement). The term "Notice of
Brownfields Development" appears to be a scrivener's error that should read "Notice of
Brownfields Property" or "Notice of Intent to Redevelop a Brownfields Property," which
are the phrases used in other sections of the Act to describe notice requirements. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.34(a) (1997) (requiring a prospective developer to
submit to DENR a Notice of Intent to Redevelop a Brownfields Property as part of the
public notice provisions of the Act); iL § 130A-310.35(a) (requiring a prospective
developer to submit to DENR a Notice of Brownfields Property if the developer wants to
enter into a brownfields agreement).
117. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.34 (1997).
11& See id. § 130A-310.34(a).
119. See id.; see also infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text (describing the
elements of a Notice of Brownfields Property and its recording).
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local governments having jurisdiction over the property; (2) publish
the notice in certain newspapers in the area where the property is
located; (3) submit a summary of the notice to the state for
publication in the North Carolina Register; and (4) post a copy of the
notice at the brownfields site.12 A sixty-day public comment period
on the brownfields agreement begins upon publication of the notice
in the North Carolina Register and the required newspaper.' In
addition, DENR must hold a public meeting on the brownfields
agreement if it receives requests for a-meeting and considers it to be
in the public interest to hold one." The prospective developer is
required to publish notice of a public meeting, if one will be held, in
newspapers of general circulation within the county in which the
brownfields property is located.'2
As part of the Notice of Intent to Redevelop a Brownfields
Property, a prospective developer must submit a Notice of
Brownfields Property to DENR.11 A Notice of Brownfields
Property must include not only a professionally certified survey plat
of areas designated by DENR relating to the property, but also a
legal description sufficient to describe the property in an instrument
of conveyance.'21 The notice must include information on the
location and dimensions of the areas of potential environmental
concern; the type, location, and quantity of contaminants existing on
the property; and any restrictions on current or future use of the
brownfields property.1'
The Act requires that the Notice of Brownfields Property, after
approval and certification by DENR, be filed by the prospective
developer with the register of deeds of the county in which the
property is located. z7 The register of deeds must then record the
120. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130.310.34(a) (1997).
121. See id. § 130A-310.34(b).
122. See ki § 130A-310.34(c).
123. See id.
124. See id. § 130A-310.35(a)-(g).
125. See id. § 130A-310.35(a). The importance of a legal description that is the same
as the kind used in an instrument of conveyance is that the Notice of Brownfields
Property also must be filed with the appropriate county register of deeds and will
accompany the deed to the property in any subsequent transfer. See id. § 130A-310.35(b).
126. See id § 130A-310.35(a)(1)-(3). The description of restrictions on property also
may include restrictions on "other property that are necessary or useful to maintain the
level of protection appropriate for the designated current or future use of the brownfields
property and that are designated in the brownfields agreement." Id. § 130A-310.35(a)(3).
The types of land-use restrictions may include, but are not limited to, restrictions on
groundwater use, building, filling, grading, excavating, and mining. See id.
127. See id § 130A-310.35(b).
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notice and index it in the grantor index under the names of the
property owners and, if different, the names of the prospective
developers of the property.'2 If a brownfields property is later sold,
leased, or otherwise transferred or conveyed, the deed or instrument
of transfer must note in the description section that the property has
been classified as a brownfields property and, if appropriate, has
been cleaned up as a brownfields property.129 The Act also provides
that the Secretary of DENR may cancel the notice filed with a
register of deeds, upon request of the property owner, if hazards on
the property have been eliminated.3 ' If this cancellation occurs, the
Secretary is required to send a statement to this effect to the register
of deeds, who then will record the statement and, if practicable, note
on the Notice of Brownfields Property that a cancellation statement
has been recorded.3
Land-use restrictions that are filed as part of the Notice of
Brownfields Property may be enforced by the owner of the property,
by DENR through its general statutory enforcement remedies or
through a civil action, by local governments with jurisdiction over the
property, or by a person subject to liability protection under the Act,
who will lose the liability protection if the land-use restriction is
violated.3  DENR or the local government with jurisdiction may
initiate enforcement actions without having first exhausted available
administrative remedies. 33  Significantly, a land-use restriction
included in a Notice of Brownfields Property cannot "be declared
unenforceable due to lack of privity of estate or contract, due to lack
of benefit to particular land, or due to lack of any property interest in
particular land."'' 3 Allowing the enforcement of land-use restrictions
as part of a brownfields agreement is a departure from the
requirements that have been imposed by the state's courts on the
enforceability of similar restrictions. Under North Carolina common
law, restrictions of this nature on the future use of property are
unenforceable except in certain limited circumstances.135  The
128. See iL § 130A-310.35(c).
129. See aL § 130A-310.35(d).
130. See U § 130A-310.35(e).
131. See U
132. See id. § 130A-310.35(f); see also Ud. §§ 130A-17 to -28 (describing DENR's
general statutory enforcement authority).
133. See id. § 130A-310.35(f).
134. Id.
135. See Case & Anderson, supra note 20, at 3; see also, e.g., Rosi v. McCoy, 319 N.C.
589,592,356 S.E.2d 568,570 (1987) ("[R]estrictive covenants... in derogation of the free
and unfettered use of land ... are to be strictly construed in favor of the unrestricted use
1036 [Vol. 76
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drafters of the Act were concerned that even if land-use restrictions
were imposed as part of a brownfields agreement, "a brownfield
property might be cleaned up to a level that was safe or appropriate
for the current uses of the property, but that the future development
spawned from those redevelopment efforts might ultimately prove to
be inconsistent with the level of cleanup originally approved.' 1 36
Thus, the provisions allowing enforcement of land-use restrictions
were included in the bill to ensure that brownfields land-use
restrictions would continue. 3 7
The construction of the Act is subject to certain limitations and
provisions. The Act is not intended to affect local government
regulation of land uses under state law.13  It does not change or
repeal any provision of a remedial program or other program
established under other public health or pollution control statutes. 39
The Act is not intended to impede DENR's ability to respond
immediately to releases of regulated substances' that could threaten
of property." (citing Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 647, 91 S.E2d 903, 912
(1956))).
136. Case & Anderson, supra note 20, at 3.
137. Prior to the introduction of House Bill 1121, the Environmental Review
Commission, at the request of DENR, recommended to the General Assembly that
legislation be introduced to allow the Secretary of DENR to approve and enforce the
imposition of land-use and other restrictions on inactive hazardous substance or waste
disposal sites. See NORTH CAROLINA ENVTL. REVIEW COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW MEETING 17 (Feb. 15, 1996) (providing a summary of comments of DENR staff
regarding the recommendation); NORTH CAROLINA ENVTL. REVIEW COMM'N,
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW MEETING 6 (Feb. 5,1997) (noting the Commission's adoption
of recommended legislation). A bill embodying this provision, Senate Bill 125, was
introduced on February 17,1997. See 11 Daily Bull.: Actions by the N.C. Gen. Assembly
(Legis. Reporting Serv., N.C. Inst. Gov't), at 6 (Feb. 17, 1997). Senate Bill 125 was
amended later in the session and was enacted on August 14, 1997. See 115 Daly Bull.:
Actions by the N.C. Gen. Assembly (Legis. Reporting Serv., N.C. Inst. Gov't), at 6 (Aug.
18, 1997). As enacted, Senate Bill 125 not only provides the Secretary with the powers
granted in the original bill, but also allows use restrictions to be applied to sites
contaminated by a discharge or release of oil or a hazardous substance, allows restrictions
on groundwater use, clarifies DENR's enforcement authority, provides that restrictions
are not unenforceable due to lack of property interest in land, and ensures that property
owners and lessees abide by the use restrictions. See Act of Aug. 14, 1997, ch. 394, 1997
N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 46. Although the Act and Senate Bill 125 contain similar
provisions regarding the enforcement of land-use restrictions, Senate Bill 125 seems to
apply to a wider range of activities than just brownfields redevelopment. See id.
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.37(a)(1) (1997). The Act requires the use of
brownfields properties to be consistent with local land-use regulations. See id.
139. See id. § 130A-310.37(2). See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-1 to -460
(Supp. 1997) (establishing state requirements for protection of public health); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-215 to -215.104u (1996 & Supp. 1997) (establishing state requirements for
water pollution control).
140. A "regulated substance" is defined by the Act to be hazardous waste, a hazardous
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public health or the environment. 4' Finally, the Act is not intended
to: (1) prevent DENR from enforcing remediation standards and
requirements that are required by the federal government for federal
program authorization or funding;42 (2) create a defense for illegal
disposal of waste or creation of pollution on a brownfields
property;43 or (3) provide relief for failure to exercise due diligence
and reasonable care in performing environmental assessments or
transaction screens.' 44
To pay DENR's costs of implementing the Act, a Brownfields
Property Reuse Act Implementation Account was created.145 The
account is to be funded primarily by fees charged to prospective
developers for submitting to DENR proposed brownfields
agreements and final remediation completion reports, although the
General Assembly may appropriate other money to the account.14
The Act also requires DENR to submit an annual report to the state
Environmental Review Commission evaluating the effectiveness of
the Act and providing recommendations for any necessary changes to
the Act. 47
During committee discussions of the Act, sponsors of the
legislation specifically stated that the legislation did not apply to sites
contaminated by leaking underground storage tanks or to federal
Superfund sites.'4 Legislators and participants concerned about this
issue apparently believed that these assurances were not enough, at
least for Superfund sites, because legislation enacted shortly after the
final passage of House Bill 1121 specifically prohibits DENR from
entering into a brownfields agreement for a brownfields site that is
identified by the EPA as a Superfund site. 49
substance, oil, or any other regulated substance subject to regulation under remedial
programs for pollution control. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.31(11) (1997).
141. See id. § 130A-310.37(3).
142. See id § 130A-310.37(7).
143. See id. § 130A-310.37(8).
144. See id. § 130A-310.37(9).
145. See id. § 130A-310.38.
146. See id § 130A-310.38 to .39. The fee charged for a proposed brownfields
agreement is $1000, and the fee for a final remediation report is $500. See Id. § 130A-
310.39(a)(1)-(2).
147. See id. § 130A-310.40. The Environmental Review Commission is a 12-member
committee of the General Assembly established by statute and charged with reviewing
environmental issues and actions by state environmental agencies. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 120-70.41 to .47 (1994 & Supp. 1997). The Commission may make recommendations for
and draft legislation pertaining to environmental issues. See U § 120-70.43(a)(6).
148. See, e.g., NORTH CAROUNA HOUSE COMM. ON ENv'T, supra note 88, at 1
(recording Rep. McComas's testimony that the bill did not apply to these sites).
149. See Dry-Cleaning Solvent Cleanup Act of 1997, ch. 392, § 4.5, 1997 N.C. Adv.
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In general, the Act addresses some, but not all, of the various
elements that commentators have found necessary for effective state
brownfield and voluntary cleanup programs. These elements include:
(1) clear delineation between low- or medium-priority cleanup sites
and high-priority cleanup sites; (2) flexible and identified cleanup
standards and procedures allowing cleanups consistent with the
proposed future use of the site; (3) oversight of voluntary remediation
by certified environmental professionals; (4) public participation; (5)
statutory lender liability protection, written assurances of liability
protection, and liability protection running with the land; (6) economic
incentives for private parties to undertake cleanups; and (7) protection
from or defenses to federal environmental enforcement actions.' The
absence of any of these elements does not necessarily mean that the
Act will be any less successful than if they were present. The elements
are useful indicators, however, of whether the Act will provide
assistance in remediating brownfield sites.
Delineation of Contaminated Sites. Delineation of contaminated
sites involves the identification of sites that will be eligible for
application of the Act's provisions and those sites that will not be
eligible. Most state brownfields programs are limited specifically to
contaminated sites not listed on federal or state hazardous waste
remediation priority lists, or sites not subject to federal or state
enforcement actions.' For example, Colorado statutes provide that
the state's voluntary cleanup and remediation program does not apply
to sites listed as federal Superfund sites, sites subject to corrective
action orders or agreements under federal or state hazardous material
enforcement programs, or property required to be permitted for
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste.'5 North Carolina's
brownfield program, as amended by the later-enacted Dry-Cleaning
Solvent Cleanup Act of 1997,153 explicitly excludes federal Superfund
Legis. Serv. 6, 34. The bill also made several other minor changes to the brownfields
legislation. See i. §§ 4.2-4.4,1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 33-34.
150. The elements discussed in this analysis are listed in Sweeney, supra note 25, at
157-65.
151. See Ud. at 157-58.
152. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b) (1997); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 376.82(1) (West Supp. 1998) (designating sites ineligible for the state's brownfields
program); O-Io REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.02 (Anderson 1997) (describing property to
which the state's voluntary remediation program does not apply); W. VA. CODE § 22-22-
2(b) (Supp. 1997) (defining brownfields to exclude certain sites subject to federal or state
corrective action requirements).
153. Dry-Cleaning Solvent Cleanup Act of 1997, ch. 392, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv.
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sites from the program." 4  However, except for sites subject to
remedial action under the state's underground petroleum storage
tank program, sites that are subject to other federal or state cleanup
enforcement requirements or remedial action programs do not
appear to be precluded from the provisions of the Act,155 which would
make sites subject to the state's existing voluntary remediation
program eligible for the brownfields program.15 6 It is uncertain
whether inclusion of different types of contaminated sites in this
manner is too broad and will create problems and confusion in
administering the brownfields program that will require later
clarification.
Use of Appropriate Remediation Standards. In addition to
delineation of sites eligible for a brownfields program, one
commentator has noted that brownfield projects should include
detailed environmental assessment and remediation procedures that
provide "realistic cleanup standards [that] enhance and legitimize the
remediation of contaminants consistent with the proposed future use of
the site."157  Some state brownfield statutes identify the specific
remediation standards that will be applied to a brownfields property.158
The Act, however, does not specify the cleanup standards that will be
applied as part of a brownfields agreement. Indeed, one of the aspects
154. See Ud § 4.5,1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 34.
155. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.31(b)(3) (1997) (defining "brownfields
property" eligible for the program). See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.94A to
.94Y (1996 & Supp. 1997) (establishing the state's leaking underground petroleum storage
tank program).
156. The definition of "brownfields property" or "brownfields site" in the Act
identifies the properties or sites as those that "may be subject to remediation under any
State remedial program." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.31(3)(b) (1997). A "remedial
program" includes any "program implemented by [DENR] for remediation .... including
the Inactive Hazardous Sites Response Act of 1997," id. § 130A-310.31(12), the Act that
includes the existing voluntary remediation program.
157. Sweeney, supra note 25, at 158-59. Some commentators have suggested the use
of "risk-based" remediation standards, which may be less stringent than adopted cleanup
standards, as a means of encouraging brownfields redevelopment. See, e.g., Robert W.
Wells, Jr., Brownfieldsfor Beginners, FLA. B.J., May 1997, at 74,76 (discussing benefits of
applying risk-based corrective actions in cleanup situations). The Act, however, does not
specify the use of risk-based standards, but does say that a prospective developer must
provide information to DENR showing that "the brownfields property will be suitable for
the uses specified in the agreement while fully protecting public health and the
environment instead of being remediated to current standards." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-310.32(a)(2) (1997). As described above, the term "current standards" as used in
the Act appears to exclude certain risk-based standards established by the Environmental
Management Commission. See supra note 100.
158. See, ag., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304 (West Supp. 1997) (establishing site-
specific remediation standards for the state's land recycling program).
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of the Act that potential developers of brownfields property may find
most attractive is the flexibility embodied in the provisions allowing
establishment of cleanup standards on a site-by-site basis consistent
with the proposed land use for the property.5 9 Allowing remediation
standards to be established in this manner, "based on the proposed use
of the property, should allow the use of less restrictive remediation
standards for industrial and commercial sites, as compared to
residential sites."'16 By then providing that the land-use restrictions
run with the property and are incorporated into the property's chain of
title,1 6' the Act attempts to ensure that exposure to contaminants that
could result in unacceptable risks are limited by prohibiting activities
that are not compatible with the remediation.' 62
Effective Oversight. Although a successful brownfields
remediation program normally embodies flexibility in its approach to
site cleanup, it has been argued that some form of oversight must be
provided to ensure that cleanup procedures are followed.'6 The Act's
provisions for a brownfields agreement require prospective developers
to provide DENR with information demonstrating compliance with
159. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.32(b)-(c) (1997). According to one person
involved in the early development of the Act, the proponents of the Act looked initially at
Pennsylvania's statute as a model, but later rejected that state's approach, particularly the
establishment of statutory cleanup criteria, as being too inflexible. Telephone Interview
with Elizabeth P. Yerxa, Partner, Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, Raleigh, N.C. (Sept. 25,
1997).
160. Weintraub & Gruza, supra note 21, at 58. At least one commentator, however,
believes that use of site-specific standards may not be necessary for successful cleanup
programs:
A recent trend among the states involves flexibility as to the level of cleanup
required for a parcel, depending on the use to which it is to be put; a plot
destined for industrial use, for example, may remain somewhat contaminated,
but a residential parcel would have to meet the strictest cleanup standards. In
addition to the difficult issues of environmental justice created by such a
legislative scheme and the possibility that lower standards may contribute to
undesirable interstate competition, evidence indicates that purchasers and
lenders are willing to proceed under a voluntary program without lowered
standards.
Brian C. Walsh, Seeding the Brownfields: A Proposed Statute Limiting Environmental
Liability for Prospective Purchasers, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 213-14 (1997).
161. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.35 (1997).
162. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 24. Anderson notes that Michigan's voluntary
cleanup program, which provides, in part, for cleanups "based on a site-specific risk
assessment that considers a large variety of factors, including reasonably foreseeable land
and resource uses," has been successful, bringing about 2000 sites overall into the state's
cleanup program. Id.; see also MICH COMP,. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a (West 1997)
(MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13A.20120a (Law Co-op. 1997)) (establishing site-cleanup criteria
based on categories of land uses).
163. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 24.
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applicable procedural requirements, 164 and require a statement of the
schedule and method for evaluating cleanup actions.165  These
requirements would seem to provide DENR with the opportunity to
receive regular reports on the progress of the remediation. Also, other
sections of the Act allow persons to request that DENR determine
whether particular types of contaminated sites have been remediated
in accordance with required cleanup standards for those sites.16 The
Act, however, does not specify the level of supervision or oversight
for remediation efforts under a brownfields agreement. A
prospective developer of a brownfield property initially must file a
Notice of Brownfield Property with DENR for approval, 67 but the
content requirements for the Notice do not specify the level of state
oversight of the proposed project, nor do they specify that the
developer must report regularly to DENR.'6 The provisions of the
Act that establish the requirements for a brownfields agreement also
do not specify oversight responsibilities or reporting requirements.169
The absence of specific oversight and reporting provisions does
not necessarily lessen the effectiveness of the Act, and may actually
make it more attractive for use. Some state voluntary cleanup
programs include provisions requiring state monitoring and oversight
of a remediation effort.170 However, it has been noted that state
agencies, often with a limited number of personnel and resources,
may not be able to conduct oversight and monitoring in a timely
manner, thus leading to delays in reviewing project elements and
164. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.32(a)(5) (1997).
165. See id. § 130A-310.32(c)(1)f.
166. See id. § 130A-308 (allowing a request for a determination of compliance for
corrective action for hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility); id. § 130A-
310.7(c) (providing for a request for determination of compliance for remediation of
hazardous substance contamination); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3(0 (Supp. 1997)
(providing for a request for determination of remediation compliance with groundwater
standards and classifications); id § 143-215.84(e) (providing for a request for
determination of compliance for remediation of sites contaminated by underground
storage tanks).
167. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
168. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.35(a) (1997).
169. See id. § 130A-310.32.
170. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-15 (Michie 1996) (requiring the state
environmental department or a departmental contractor to "[o]versee and review the
implementation of the voluntary remediation work plan"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.567
(West Supp. 1998) (establishing procedures for oversight by state Department of Natural
Resources for voluntary remediation programs); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a (1997)
(providing that prospective developers of brownfield properties can "request the
assistance of the secretary [of the state environment department] in reviewing and
overseeing work plans to investigate, abate, remove, remediate and monitor those
properties").
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consequent delays in cleanup efforts.'7' Other states have established
statutory schemes that allow private remediation contractors and
laboratories to provide oversight of voluntary remediation.'71 North
Carolina, for example, provides for this type of oversight and
management in its existing voluntary remediation program.'73
Although reporting requirements may sacrifice some flexibility, it
might be beneficial for the Act to provide for regular monitoring
reports by the prospective developer, or to extend the certified
environmental professional provisions of the state's existing voluntary
remediation program to the Act.
Public Participation. For a brownfield redevelopment project to
be successful, it is essential that members of the public, particularly
the community members most affected by the project, are involved in
or at least aware of the project.74 As one commentator notes, "[a]
favorable response from the community to a proposed brownfield
redevelopment project that involves risks is more likely when
legitimate representatives of neighborhood interests have been
involved in a meaningful decision-making process."' 5 Unfortunately,
a number of states provide for minimal public participation in
voluntary cleanup and brownfield programs.176 By limiting public
171. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 24.
172. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10(B)(1)(b) (Anderson 1997) (requiring
the use of "services of a certified professional to verify that the property and any remedial
activities undertaken at the property in connection with a voluntary action comply with
applicable standards").
173. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.9(c) (1997).
174. See generally Andrew, supra note 16, at 31 (discussing the stakeholder issues in
brownfields redevelopment, particularly community interests); Eisen, supra note 26, at
972-77 & nn.382-94, 998-1017 (providing extensive discussion and identification of state
remediation programs and their public participation requirements); Stephen C. Jones &
Brooks M. Beard, How to Develop a Brownfield, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITG.
STRATEGY, Oct. 1996, at *1, *4, available in WESTLAW, ENVTCLST database
(discussing community involvement as an element of a successful brownfields project);
Weintraub & Gruza, supra note 21, at 69-70 (discussing the need for public and private
dialogue regarding brownfields redevelopment).
175. Eisen, supra note 26, at 1009-10 (footnote omitted).
176. See id. at 972-73. Professor Eisen comments that
Ohio makes no reference to community involvement in individual brownfield
development projects. Pennsylvania allows for public participation beyond
notice only if requested by the affected municipality and then only if the
developer chooses to cleanup [sic] a site using the site-specific cleanup standard.
Illinois provides that the developer may elect to develop a "community outreach
plan," but requires only that the state develop guidance to assist developers in
reaching out to the affected community. Some states provide that the developer
may elect to conduct further community outreach efforts; Rhode Island
mandates this.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Thomas G. Kessler, The Land Recycling and
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participation in a redevelopment project, states may be attempting to
avoid possible delays in or deterrents to remediation of a particular
site.17 Such actions, however, can preclude opportunities for
brownfields developers to incorporate community concerns into their
project goals and to build community support for a project.178 They
also can create resistance to a project "due to a lack of input in
threshold decisions."' 79
The Act's provisions for public participation in the development
of a brownfields project should overcome a number of these concerns.
The Act requires that "[a] prospective developer who desires to enter
into a brownfields agreement ... notify the public and community in
which the brownfields property is located of planned remediation and
redevelopment activities."' 8  The methods for making this
notification-submitting a Notice of Intent to Redevelop a
Brownfields Property to DENR,181 publishing the Notice in local
newspapers,' submitting the Notice to affected local governments,'
and providing opportunities for a public meeting'K--will assist the
public in learning about the proposal. It is incumbent on brownfields
Environmental Remediation Standards Act: Pennsylvania Tells CERCLA Enough Is
Enough, 8 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 161, 193 (1997) (noting that under Pennsylvania's Land
Recycling Act, citizens interested in a cleanup project must convince a municipality to
request development of a public participation plan). But cf. James W. Creenan & John Q.
Lewis, Pennsylvania's Land Recycling Program Solving the Brownfields Problem with
Remediation Standards and Limited Liability, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 661, 693 (1996)
("Although public participation in the complex remediation process [under
Pennsylvania's law] may be limited, the open-door policy allows citizens to maintain a
voice in a problem that affects the entire community."). For descriptions of public
participation requirements in 17 state voluntary cleanup programs, see generally U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 58, at 43-45,59.
177. See Eisen, supra note 26, at 972; Sweeney, supra note 25, at 160.
178. Michael Sweeney suggests that public participation in brownfields development
can serve project developers in their public relations efforts regarding the project. He
comments that, "with the proper amount of 'spin,' ... [project developers] can publicize
the environmental protection benefits associated with the redevelopment of impaired
property ... Moreover, volunteers can take advantage of public notice and comment to
dispel the potential for Not-In-My-Backyard complaints brought on by project
opponents." Sweeney, supra note 25, at 160.
179. Eisen, supra note 26, at 1006. Professor Eisen notes that even in states that
require some form of public participation, community involvement usually will come after
it already has been decided that the site will be developed, how the site will be used, and
what the proposed cleanup standard will be. See id "If the community perceives that it
has no opportunity to influence these decisions, projects may be thwarted by local
resistance." Id. at 1006-07 (footnote omitted).
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.34(a) (1997).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id
184. See id § 130A-310.34(c).
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developers, however, to ensure adequate public participation in the
project's development outside of these statutory requirements and
options. Including affected community members in discussions about
redevelopment of brownfield sites prior to developing remediation
plans, and perhaps before submitting notices to the state, will prevent
misunderstandings and reduce opposition to cleanups that may involve
remediation to standards different than those currently required.
Certain authors also have suggested that it is important to ensure that
community members are involved to'some degree in identifying the
appropriate, but not necessarily the specific, environmental standards
that will be employed at a brownfields site.I'5
At least one commentator has suggested the creation of
statutory mechanisms for providing early public participation in
brownfields remediation projects. These include requiring a
"community impact statement" or mandating the creation of
community working groups.8 6 Although these mechanisms may
foster greater initial public involvement in a remediation process,
they seem to create another level of review and control that may
have a chilling effect on potential voluntary efforts to redevelop
brownfields properties. The Act, in line with its general notion of
flexibility, does not mandate these methods. It does seem
appropriate, however, for the state to ensure adequate support for a
project within the affected community before entering a brownfields
agreement. Models fostering early community involvement in
brownfields projects can ensure adequate voluntary participation.
Such models include holding public dialogues or forming
(nonmandatory) working groups to discuss a project prior to its
initiation to incorporate community concerns into the decision-
making process.1 7
Liability Protections. Public participation in the remediation of
brownfields sites is an important element to ensure community
acceptance of redevelopment of such sites. In order to induce
prospective developers of brownfields sites even to attempt such an
185. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, supra note 33, at 188-89. The authors note that "[t]he
interests of the community [in appropriate cleanup standards] ... will be represented only
if community members are given the opportunity to participate up front and are properly
equipped to engage in meaningful and knowledgeable interaction." Id. at 189.
186. See, eg., Eisen, supra note 26, at 1015-20 (suggesting the establishment of these
types of processes).
187. See BROWNiIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, supra note 33, at 189-91 (describing the public dialogue and
working group processes in the setting of brownfields redevelopment).
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effort, however, assurance must be given that liability protections will
be provided. As mentioned earlier, the Act provides that a
prospective developer who enters into a brownfields agreement with
DENR and who complies with the terms of the agreement will not be
held liable for remediation of contaminants identified in the
agreement.188  This liability protection extends to lenders or
fiduciaries financing the remediation or redevelopment.189
Commentators have noted that without liability protection, lenders
are unlikely to finance a redevelopment project until cleanup is
completed and the state has signed-off on liability protection, thus
limiting the availability of up-front financing for site investigation
and remediation. 19°
With respect to providing lender protection, the Act mirrors the
provisions of other state statutes that provide similar general
assurances. 191 It is unclear, however, whether general provisions of
this nature are sufficient to induce "the degree of 'comfort' necessary
to bring a lender into a Brownfields transaction."'19 Several state
statutes are explicit in the protection provided to lenders, using
language that specifically defines the activities of a lender that would
exclude it from liability.193 One commentator has noted that to be
effective, most state lender liability protection provisions "provide
lenders with notice of when their attempts to protect their investments
will be subject to environmental liability" and define "active
participation in management" as the delineation point "at which
lenders may exercise control over a Brownfields transaction" and thus
become subject to potential liability.' 4 Also, it has been suggested that
18& See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
189. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.33(a)(1)-(5) (1997).
190. See Sweeney, supra note 25, at 161; see also Margaret Murphy, Brownfields Sites:
Removing Lender Concerns as a Barrier to Redevelopment, 113 BANKING L. 440,443-44
(1996) (describing specific lender concerns regarding brownfields sites).
191. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175, subd. 6(2) (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 22-
22-18(a)(7) (Supp. 1997).
192. Sweeney, supra note 25, at 161.
193. See, &g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 7-201(x)(2) (Supp. 1997) (providing detailed
exclusion for lenders as responsible parties for voluntary remediation site contamination);
MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 324.20101a (West 1997) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13A.20101a
(Law Co-op. 1997)) (describing the actions that would lead a lender holding a security
interest in a brownfields site to be found to have participated in the management of the
site and thus subject to liability); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.26 (Anderson 1997)
(establishing detailed provisions for exempting lenders from liability for contamination at
voluntary cleanup sites); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6027.1-6027.14 (West Supp. 1997)
(creating, as part of state's land-recycling program, the Economic Development Agency,
Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability Protection Act).
194. Sweeney, supra note 25, at 161-62.
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"concrete parameters must be established through which lenders can
'workout' loans and otherwise protect financing secured by impaired
property."195  Whether it is necessary to establish these latter
parameters by statute, as well as the more detailed exemption language
found in certain other states,196 is a question of how comfortable
lenders will be with general statements of liability protection such that
they will engage in financing brownfields redevelopment. 197
One element that brownfields and voluntary cleanup programs
usually provide-written assurances of protection from liability for
future enforcement actions-is not specifically identified in the Act.
These assurances, which ordinarily take the form of covenants not to
sue or certificates of completion, are viewed as "non-economic
incentives integral to the success of a Brownfields restoration and
voluntary cleanup program.' 98 The bill creating the Act does provide
for a type of certificate of completion by allowing persons to request
that DENR determine whether particular types of contaminated sites
have been remediated to current standards for the type of remediation
required at that site and issue written notification that no further
remediation is necessary.199 This written notification, however, is not
identified as a mechanism for ensuring protection from future liability,
although it likely could be used as such.
The absence of a statutory requirement for a specific, written
covenant not to sue tied to liability protection could be handled
through negotiations between DENR and a prospective developer as
part of the development of a brownfields agreement. Indeed, the Act
states that a prospective developer entering into a brownfields
agreement who complies with the agreement is not liable for
"remediation of areas of contaminants identified in the brownfields
agreement" as long as public health and the environment are not
195. Id. at 162. The author explains "workout" provisions as restructuring terms of a
security interest, requiring additional rent, exercising forbearance, and other actions by
which a lender may prevent the default of a brownfields property redeveloper and protect
the lender's security interest in the property. See id at 162 n.352 (citing MICH. COup.
LAws ANN. § 3242.0101a(3) (West 1997) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13A.20101a(3) (Law Co-
op. 1997))).
196. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
197. See Murphy, supra note 190, at 449-50. The author comments that states have
taken differing approaches in either providing explicit or implicit protection for lenders
from liability concerns, and that "[f]or lenders, these implicit protections may be as solid
as explicit exemptions." Id. at 449.
198. Sweeney, supra note 25, at 163.
199. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
200. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 25 ("Liability protection offered by agency sign-
off... generally consists of... a no-further-action letter or certificate of completion.").
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endangered."3 Thus, the agreement itself may serve as sufficient
written assurance. It is unclear, however, whether this will be sufficient
to provide comfort to a prospective developer that the state will not
pursue enforcement actions against the developer and to "add[] value
to [a] lender's underlying collateral [that] ... can eliminate some of
the financial concerns of lenders."
An important link in ensuring that liability protection is
available for prospective developers, subsequent purchasers, and
lenders is a requirement that the liability protection run with the
land.203 Incorporating this protection, and other provisions such as
land-use restrictions, into the chain of title gives subsequent
purchasers notice of the status of the property and of any remaining
contaminants on the property.2 Although the Act provides liability
protection from future remediation requirements to future owners of
a brownfields property and to successors and assigns of persons
originally receiving the liability protection,205 it does not specifically
provide that any covenants not to sue or other written assurances of
liability protection are to be incorporated into the property's chain of
title. Notices of Brownfield Property, which can incorporate land-use
restrictions on the property, are required to be recorded with the
deed for the property, however.2 6 In addition, the Act provides that
in transactions involving the property, the deed or other instrument
of transfer must show that "the brownfields property has been
classified and, if appropriate, cleaned up as a brownfields
property."m This requirement may serve to ensure that a future
owner or purchaser of the property is placed on notice that the
property has been remediated as a brownfields site, but it is unclear if
it will provide firm assurance of liability protection to such owners or
purchasers. Some states have taken the next step by requiring the
incorporation of certificates of completion for remediation,
201. See N.C GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.33(a) (1997).
202. Murphy, supra note 190, at 449 n.42; see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E,
§ 3Aj)(1) (Law Co-op. 1996) (authorizing the state to enter into covenants not to sue);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12 (Anderson 1997) (providing for covenants not to sue);
Anderson, supra note 41, at 25 (noting that providing liability protection through required
covenants not to sue is the trend in recent state voluntary cleanup or brownfields
proposals); Geltman, Recycling Land, supra note 65, at 9 (commenting that most state
programs provide that formal covenants not to sue will be issued once remediation is
completed).
203. See Sweeney, supra note 25, at 164.
204. See id
205. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.33(a)(2), (4) (1997).
206. See id. § 130A-310.35(b)-(e).
207. Id. § 130A-310.35(d) (emphasis added).
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covenants not to sue, or other written assurances in the property's
deed? 8
Economic Incentives and Coordination with Federal Activities.
The final two elements that have been identified as keys to effective
brownfields programs-economic incentives for private parties to
undertake cleanups, and protection from or defenses to federal
environmental enforcement actionsm--are either not specifically
identified as such or are not present in the Act. The Act's provision
for liability protection may provide an economic incentive that may
enhance lender and developer comfort enough to encourage
financing of brownfields projects 10 In addition, the development of
case-by-case cleanup standards for brownfields properties may result
in reduced costs of cleanup. Beyond these provisions, however, the
Act does not provide other state economic incentives or funding
programs to encourage redevelopment. Other states have recognized
financial incentives of this type as important components of their
brownfield redevelopment programs' The Act does provide for
payment of fees by prospective developers for various agreements
and reports submitted to DENR. However, the funds generated
from these fees, and any other funds appropriated by the General
Assembly, are to be used to defray DENR's costs of implementing
the Act rather than to provide grants or loans for brownfields
redevelopment 13 The General Assembly may develop these types
of incentives once the level of interest in and effectiveness of the
program is ascertained.
The ability of a state to provide protection from or defenses to
federal environmental enforcement actions is limited 4 According to
208. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.14(A) (Anderson 1997) (providing that
covenants not to sue must be recorded with the deed for remediated property and run
with the land).
209. See Sweeney, supra note 25, at 162-63,165.
210. See Andrew, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that state efforts to limit liability help
"reassur[e] third-party financing efforts").
211. See Smary & DeWitt, supra note 34, at 283-84. The authors indicate that certain
states provide financial incentives, such as tax incentives, loan programs, and grant
programs. See id; see also MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 208.38d (West 1997) (MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 7.558(38d) (Law Co-op. 1997)) (creating credits against state single-business tax
for investment at brownfield sites); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.16(B)(1) (Anderson
1997) (creating tax credits against corporate and state income taxes); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, §§ 6026.702 (West Supp. 1997) (establishing grant and loan programs for brownfield
redevelopment).
212. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.39 (1997).
213. See id. § 130A-310.38.
214. See Murphy, supra note 190, at 453 (noting that despite state lender liability
limitations, "state brownfields programs cannot address the additional uncertainties
10491998]
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one commentator, states have attempted to address this problem by
excluding federal sites from brownfields or voluntary cleanup
programs.215 In addition, states have attempted to address potential
federal liability by entering negotiations with, and, in some instances,
signing memoranda of agreement with, the EPA that provide, inter
alia, that the EPA will not pursue enforcement actions at sites that
have been remediated through a voluntary cleanup or brownfields
program.2 16 Although some commentators have encouraged this
action,217 others have noted that such memoranda of agreement do
not provide substantive protection from potential EPA actions.218
North Carolina has not entered into a memorandum of agreement,
presented by the potential application of federal laws to these sites"); Walsh, supra note
160, at 210 (noting that "because [state voluntary programs] operate at the state level,
they cannot provide assurance that the federal EPA will not pursue the owner for further
cleanup").
215. See Walsh, supra note 160, at 210. The author notes that in other instances, "the
landowner must rely on federal-state comity, the small scale of the contamination, or the
federal government's sense of public relations and assume that the EPA will not attack
property which has already received a clean bill of health from a state government." Id.
(citation omitted).
216. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 61, at 48-49 (listing 10 states
that, as of 1995, had entered into memoranda of agreement); Andrew, supra note 16, at
30 (identifying Illinois as another state that has entered into a memorandum with a
similar exemption); Goff-Sanders, supra note 28, at 152 (noting that Minnesota entered
into a memorandum of agreement with the EPA in 1995 to provide relief from Superfund
liability for persons voluntarily cleaning up sites). Colorado takes an additional step by
providing that if the EPA
indicates that it is investigating a site which is the subject of an approved
voluntary clean-up plan or no action petition, the department shall actively
pursue a determination by the [EPA] that the property not be addressed under
the federal [Superfund] act or, in the case of property being addressed through a
voluntary clean-up plan, that no further federal action be taken with respect to
the property at least until the voluntary clean-up plan is completely
implemented.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-309(2) (1997).
217. See, ag., Goff-Sanders, supra note 28, at 152.
218. See, eg., Mark D. Anderson, The Limits of Innovative Cleanup Laws: A State
Update, ENvTL. COmPLIANCE & LrrIG. STRATEGY, Mar. 1997, at *1, *4, available in
WESTLAW, ENVTCLST Database. Mark Anderson comments that
[u]nfortunately, the memoranda of agreement that have been entered into thus
far simply provide a policy statement that [the EPA] will refrain from taking
action at the sites addressed in the agreement. For those states that are still
negotiating a state memorandum of agreement (SMOA), the picture is even less
attractive. Draft EPA guidance on SMOAs includes language ensuring that
there is nothing in the SMOA that prevents EPA from taking action at any of
the sites identified in such agreements .... Prospective developers and
purchasers are unlikely to have great confidence in a simple policy statement
that could be reversed without great effort on the federal government's part.
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although DENR is reviewing the issue.21
As it moved through the General Assembly, the Act
encountered little resistance or opposition z20 Both the business
community and the environmental community supported the final
version of the legislation.221 DENR, although concerned about the
uncertain funding and lack of additional resources provided in the
Actt 2 was given an additional mechanism to help the state remediate
contaminated sites in the state. Despite this support, the actual
ramifications and, in some cases, the interpretation of the Act, are
uncertain. Questions remain about how attractive the Act will be for
redevelopment of brownfields if only prospective purchasers or
developers of the property can take advantage of its provisions.tm
The question of the type and extent of remediation contained in
brownfield agreements will be decided on a case-by-case basis
pursuant to guidance that will have to be developed by DENR." In
addition, although legislative materials indicate that the Act was
designed to address brownfields created at industrial sitestm staff of
DENR have indicated that application of the Act likely will not be
restricted to just industrial sites.m Regardless of these questions,
some observers, while acknowledging the shortcomings of the
legislation, believe that the Act is an important step that will require
modification over time to address concerns fully and to become a
219. Whisnant Interview, supra note 11.
220. See NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE COMM. ON ENV'T, supra note 88, at 1 (noting
Rep. McComas's testimony that "he was not aware of any opposition to the bill"); see also
NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE COMM. ON FIN., supra note 91, at 4 (noting similar testimony).
221. See Rawllns, supra note 72, at A3. The executive director of the NCCBI
indicated that the brownfields legislation "had been the group's main environmental
legislation of the [legislative] session." Id.
222. Whisnant Interview, supra note 11.
223. It has been noted that
it is unclear how much the bill will actually be utilized, since it excludes from its
protection any responsible party who may have caused or contributed to the
contamination at the site. This exclusion will, undoubtedly, prevent the bill from
being used to cleanup many brownfields properties that continue to be owned or
operated by entities who would be deemed to have caused or contributed to the
contamination of the property.
Case & Anderson, supra note 20, at 4.
224. Nicholson Interview, supra note 19; see Letter from Grover Nicholson, Head,
Federal Remediation Branch, Superfund Section, Division of Waste Management, North
Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to author (Feb. 6, 1998)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
225. See NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE COMM. ON ENV'T, supra note 88, at I (containing
statement by Committee Counsel that "[House Bill 1121] provides that these sites be
cleaned up for industrial use").
226. Nicholson Interview, supra note 19.
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viable mechanism for redevelopment.'
In adopting the Act, the North Carolina General Assembly
established a framework for providing prospective developers of
contaminated property with an incentive to accomplish remediation
in a less costly manner with at least some assurance of limited
liability from state enforcement actions. The ultimate effect of the
Act will be determined in part, however, by whether there is
sufficient interest by the development community and local
governments in using the provisions of the Act to redevelop
brownfields, particularly because parties responsible for the
contamination are excluded from the Act. Questions also remain
regarding how the state will implement its responsibilities under the
Act, including what method of establishing cleanup standards the
state will employ and how it will structure brownfields agreements.
In addition, it will be necessary to assess the Act to determine if it
provides sufficient opportunity for public participation and
involvement in the brownfields redevelopment process. Overall,
however, the Act should assist in "reusing industrial sites as industrial
properties and preventing unnecessary consumption of pristine
property."m
DAvID B. HAWLEY
227. E.g., McComas Interview, supra note 11.
228. Geltman, Recycling Land, supra note 65, at 10.
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